Despite recent currency crises, most of the Asia-Pacific economies continue to be among the most attractive markets in the world and now appear to be recovering rapidly. An important element in understanding the dynamics of firm strategies in Asia is the nature of nonmarket strategies, which concern efforts to respond to and influence the political-economic-social environment. To examine such nonmarket strategies and how they fit with other firm tasks, this article first focuses on "positional analysis"-that is, how market forces, firm competencies, and the nonmarket environment influence the choice of trade, investment, or some mix, at the national, regional, or global level. It then considers the nature of "strategic analysis," consisting of a firm's choices of market arena, a transaction cost analysis of organization forms for market penetration, and a distributive politics analysis of nonmarket issues. These factors combine to influence the firm's integrated strategic choice. Implementation of this choice is based on "tactical analysis" that focuses on the market, organizational, and nonmarket tactics that firms must pursue to succeed with their chosen strategy. Business and Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2001 Corporate Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Asia: A Conceptual Framework VINOD K. AGGARWAL 
Introduction
Despite the lingering effects of the regional currency crises in the late 1990s and Japan's stubborn economic af iction, the Asia-Paci c economies continue to be among the most attractive markets in the world. But the ups and downs of East Asian markets have forced Japanese, American, and European rms to rethink their regional market strategies. Some rms have responded by increasing investments in the region, hoping to acquire distressed assets and strengthen their position to pro t from renewed growth. Other rms are concerned that excessive reliance on Asia has made them vulnerable to renewed upheaval in the region, pushing them to diversify their operations in newly emerging markets in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.
Another important element of rm strategies in Asia is their nonmarket component. While rms must pursue market strategies to position themselves in the global and regional economies, they also interact with governments to secure favorable policies. For example, rms are concerned about access to closed or restricted markets for exports and investment, regulations on their subsidiaries, and changing tax policies. They often work with both their home and host governments to implement policy changes. At the same time, governments have objectives of their own vis-à-vis both home-based and foreign-based rms, which requires rms to negotiate with governments. 1 The Asian focus of this special issue on multinationa l rm strategies is driven by four key factors. First, East Asian countries provide recent examples of both rapid growth and severe recession, accompanied by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and U.S. pressures for liberalization . Thus, a focus on Asia provides an excellent laboratory to analyze shifting rm strategies in times of good and bad fortune. Second, rms from developing Asian countries pose a signi cant competitive challenge to foreign rms in some sectors. Not only do they often have dominant positions in their home markets, but they have also been successful in European and American markets. Third, many Asian rms have close ties to governments. Indeed, the nature of government-business relations is particularly intricate in the Asian context. Most of the newly industrializing countries, both the so-called rst and second tiers, have actively used industrial policy measures to bolster their rms' competitiveness . Restrictions on investments, technology transfer, export performance requirements, preferential nancing, and a host of other instruments have been commonplace in most of these countries. Fourth, the Asia-Paci c has been one of the most interesting arenas in the world to understand the interplay of different types of institutiona l arrangements. The existing mix of different regime forms-representing regionalism, sectoralism, and globalism -has played a role in shaping outcomes in what has generally been considered an institution-poo r region.
2
This article discusses the theoretical approach that informs the empirical analyses in this issue. The analytical framework proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses what I term "positional analysis"-how market forces, rm competencies, and the nonmarket environment in uence rms' choices of trade and investment at the national, regional, or global level. Section 3 turns to "strategic analysis," an examination of the choices rms make in response to their market environments. This topic includes a transaction cost analysis of organizational forms for market penetration, and a distributiv e politics analysis of nonmarket issues. These factors combine to in uence the rm's integrated strategic choice. Once these strategies are formulated , rms can choose from a range of options for implementation, which are the subject of the "tactical analysis" presented in Section 4. The tactical analysis considers the market, nonmarket, and organizational tactics that rms employ to pursue their chosen strategies. Figure 1 provides a roadmap of the analysis that follows. As Figure 1 indicates, the rm's choice of trade or investment, integrated strategic choice, and implementation efforts can be conceptualized using an analytical model of three "triangles:" positional , strategic, and tactical analysis. Each triangle, representing a phase or component of a rm's integrated strategy, includes factors that must be accounted for in its analysis. Moreover, the policy or policies that a rm pursues, along with those with which its competitors respond, can create a cycle of feedback and continued analysis.
Positional analysis: market factors, core competencies, and the nonmarket environment in diverse geographical arenas
Analysts have traditionall y focused on the market environment in which rms operate, and on the organization of rms. Traditional market analysis focuses on elements such as an industry's technologica l pro le, the number of major players, the barriers to entry, and so forth. Market analysis of corporate strategy and organization often also covers the internal structures of rms and their implications for competitiveness , the effects of different types of rm organization, the design of incentive systems, and so on.
In addition to these critical factors-the market environment and a rm's organization-a rm's performance also depends on the social, political, and legal context within which it operates: that is, its nonmarket environment.
3 This includes analyses of key issues, relevant interests, availability of information, and existing institution s (known as the "four I's"), and how these factors relate to a rm's positionin g at the national, regional, or global level. For instance, as rms decide on whether or not to enter developing Asian markets, to increase their investments, or to alter their trading patterns, they must consider the nonmarket characteristics of speci c national markets. Their strategies must also be sensitive to the broader regional and global internationa l environment, and especially to the roles played by various relevant international institutions .
These elements provid e the basis for the positiona l analysis of the "triangle" of factors depicted in Figure 2 . As illustrated in Figure 2 , a positional analysis maps rms' initial strategic choices among trade, direct investment, and partnership with a local rm. Before examining the various elements of this analysis in more detail, the importance of the geographical arena is considered.
Geographical orientatio n
Before undertaking market, rm, or nonmarket analyses, we must consider the geographic context of rm operations. First of all, rms must focus on the market and nonmarket characteristics of the particular country or countries they plan to enter. This "multidomestic " focus suggests that a rm must be sensitive to the individual characteristics of different target countries. 4 Regarding a country's market, this involves a consideration of existing and potential competitors, suppliers, and the like. An assessment of a country's nonmarket environment focuses on the types of its existing or potential policies regarding investment, including joint venture requirements, export performance demands, local content rules, technology transfer agreements, and multilateral investment initiatives . In addition, both market and nonmarket environments are shaped by previous political bargains or coalitions, historical precedents, and cultural values.
Increasingly, however, rms must look beyond factors at the country level to those of the regional and global environments as well. Theoretical work on global corporate positionin g is quite advanced. However, analyses of regional strategies, both from a market and nonmarket perspective, have been given short shrift. From a nonmarket perspective, the proliferation of regional accords such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Paci c Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the European Union (EU) is often accompanied by increasingly tight political or institutiona l ties. In the most advanced regional integration project, the movement toward a single European market radically altered market calculations and forced many European rms into mergers or alliances. Firms also began to develop a lobbying apparatus as many aspects of policymaking , at both the European and broader international levels, shifted to the European Commission in Brussels. 5 In the Asia-Paci c, APEC, ASEAN, and the Closer Economic Relations (CER) accord between Australia and New Zealand have become important arenas for rm in uence, while the institutiona l policies of these accords affect corporate strategies. 6 The development of these regional institution s means that rms cannot focus only on the policymaking in speci c countries, but must be aware of and engaged in policymaking at the regional level.
In particular, two ways in which regional institution s evolve can in uence the trade and investment strategies of rms: widening and deepening. Widening refers to the accession of new members into existing arrangements. Deepening entails the enhanced coordination of monetary, scal, social, labor, foreign, and other policies. These can include trade policies such as regional content requirements, patent protection, and lobbying guidelines. Obviously, efforts to widen and deepen regional institution s can signi cantly alter regional market and nonmarket conditions . Firms can, of course, concentrate on becoming globally oriented and competitive. From a global nonmarket perspective, the arrangements reached in the General Agreements on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), have greatly in uenced rm strategies. For example, the liberalization of speci c sectors through the GATT-including tariff reductions and the removal of nontariff barriers-has considerably increased global competition. In aerospace, agriculture, steel, electronics, nancial services, and other sectors, rms must take into account the new regulations of the WTO. The Uruguay Round of GATT introduced a host of new issues that affect rms, including changes in intellectua l property protection and the linkage between trade and investment through the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) agreement. Firms have, of course, been a key driving force in setting the agenda of the GATT and WTO, and have lobbied their governments with speci c concerns. For example, U.S. nancial service rms were instrumenta l in putting the issue of nancial sector liberalization on the Uruguay Round agenda in 1986, 5. Dupont (2001) . 6. For discussion of such in uence efforts, see Ravenhill (2001) . For background on APEC, see Aggarwal and Morrison (1998) . and many information technology, entertainment, and pharmaceutical companies actively pushed for institutionalize d protection of intellectual property.
7
At the global sectoral level, arrangements such as the Multi-ber Arrangement in textiles or steel voluntary export restraints have long in uenced sourcing and production decisions. These arrangements have coexisted uneasily with the GATT and now the WTO, and pressure has built to eliminate such sectoral arrangements. 8 The latest trend at the global sectoral level, however, is the opening of markets.
9 Following the creation of the ITA in 1996, APEC ministers in 1997 agreed to consider nine additiona l sectors for fast-track trade barrier reduction: chemicals, energy-related equipment and services, environmental goods and services, forest products, medical equipment, telecommunication s equipment, sh and sh products, toys, and gems and jewelry. Although rms actively lobbied on all sides of this issue to advance their interests, the 1998 APEC meeting in Kuala Lumpur saw a failure to advance this agenda due to Japanese resistance to liberalizing forestry and shery products. At this point, the whole package of nine sectors has been shifted to the WTO for negotiations.
10
When assessing geographically based strategies, it is useful to distinguis h production from marketing orientations , both on a market and nonmarket basis. To graphically illustrate the possibilities , we can brie y consider the nine cells in Figure 3 , with two extreme points labeled to provide some bearings on strategies. Thus, for example, one could invest in China, and simply sell there (national). Or, one could sell throughout Asia (regional), or globally. Or alternatively, one could invest or set up on a regional basis in several countries in Asia through a trading company or production hub, and then sell only in a single country, to the whole region, or worldwide. Finally, globally based rms could focus on single countries, a region, or in the "ultimate" globalization , be "pure global rms."
Thus our understandin g of rm strategies must be informed by the particular geographical context as well as the relevant market forces, core competencies, 7. Aggarwal (1992) . 8. See Aggarwal, Keohane, and Yof e (1987) . 9. For a discussion of the dangers of this approach, see Aggarwal and Ravenhill (2001) . 10. Aggarwal (2000) .
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Market forces
The most popular analytical approach to market-based decisionmaking is that developed by Michael Porter, based on the vast literature in industria l organization. 11 Porter proposed ve speci c factors, or the " ve forces model." These forces are: (1) rivalry among established rms; (2) risk of entry by potential competitors; (3) threat of substitutes ; (4) bargaining power of suppliers; and (5) bargaining power of buyers. These forces also provide a basis for the analysis of what rms face in terms of strategy formulation. Re ecting the second half of the well-known SWOT acronym (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities , and threats), market analysis examines the opportunitie s and threats posed by the ve forces.
12
The notion of rivalry among rms refers to the classic issue of market structure-that is, whether the market is atomistic, oligopolistic , duopolistic , or monopolistic . The implications of structure come from whether rms pursue strategy autonomously or interdependently . The other two elements of the rivalry concept are demand conditions and barriers to exit. The rst of these refers to the growth potential of the industry, and the second concerns the impediments rms face in leaving the industry. In a market with high growth potential, rivalry will be less intense since the game is not zero-sum; competitive rm strategies can coexist with each yielding success. Attention to exit barriers can improve understanding of why rms might resist exiting a relatively poor market, because of the high costs such a move may entail. Exit barriers can also explain why rms might be more willing to take political action to block the entry of foreign competitors.
13
The analysis of potential competitors is based on barriers to entry. These barriers includ e such factors as existing brand loyalty, the cost advantages of various production techniques, and economies of scale that arise from large-scale production.
14 Other factors include the need for extensive capital investments, the cost of switching to another product, and access to distributio n channels. Each of these barriers poses an obstacle to entry. Over time, however, these barriers tend to erode, as in the example of the effect of the entry of minimills on the steel industry. Governments may also help their nationally based rms overcome barriers by subsidizing their initial efforts at entry.
The third factor-the threat of substitutes -is straightforward . With few substitutes , rms in an industry will face little competition from outsiders. Finally, the fourth and fth factors-the bargaining power of buyers and 11. Porter (1980) . 12. It is worth noting that other analysts have criticized Porter's approach for being excessively structural and unresponsive to rm strategies. This debate, similar to the "Great Man" vs. "Forces of History" argument in both political science and history, concerns the plasticity of structural forces as opposed to the initiative that rms might take to mold the factors themselves. 13. See Aggarwal, Keohane, and Yof e (1987) . 14. See Bain (1956) .
suppliers-are part of the downstream and upstream game of market power. If buyers or suppliers are few in number, their oligopolisti c position will allow them to secure better prices when interacting with rms in a particular industry.
Each of these ve forces can be analyzed in terms of the opportunitie s and threats it poses. Put most simply, the stronger the market forces in a particular industry (a highly competitive market structure, low barriers to entry, many substitutes , and buyers and supplies with market power), the greater the challenges facing its rms.
Firm core competencies
Much has been written about the factors that contribute to a rm's competitive ability. Our focus in this special issue is primarily on the external factors of markets and nonmarket environments, rather than on corporate organization or management. Regarding a rm's ability to respond strategically to changing market and nonmarket conditions , most analysts focus on the division between a rm's resources and its capabilities. 15 The term "resources" refers to both tangible and intangible factors, ranging from buildings , plant, and the like, to less tangible items such as a rm's reputation, know-how, and patents. "Capabilities" refers to a rm's ability to use resources in a systematic way to advance its interests, based on its structure and control system.
In terms of analysis, the focus is on rm's strengths and weaknesses (the rst elements of the SWOT agenda). Yet there is considerable debate as to which resources and capabilitie s constitute strengths-and under what conditions -and which constitute weaknesses. Thus, consultants and business school analysts have attempted to direct attention away from the actual products that rms produce to focus on their capabilities and competencies. The most popular work on core competencies, developed by C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, examines rms in terms of their basic sets of competencies, ones which might be transferred to other areas and products. Rather than focusing on speci c resources, core competencies focus on a vaguer sense of capabilities including "communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working across organizational boundaries." 16 Starting from these core competencies, Hamel and Prahalad argue that rms must then go on to develop core products and organize their business accordingly. This view contrasts with the focus on products made by single business units within an organization that operate in a semi-autonomous manner.
There is a good deal of debate in the literature on rm-level abilities, but the basic view is that of the rm as capable of managing structural constraints systematically , rather than being at the mercy of Porter's ve forces. Indeed, the literature on corporate strategy has evolved from a rather static picture of rms attempting to t into the environment within which they are operating to a more dynamic perspective in which rms generate and create market opportunitie s for themselves.
15. Hill and Jones (1995) . 16. Hamel and Prahalad (1989) , p. 82.
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Hamel and Pralahad, for example, speak of strategic "intent" as opposed to strategic t. 17 In their view, rms draw on their resources and capabilities to affect their market environments and to position themselves dynamically to enhance their pro t potential. To complete the picture, we must also add to these market strategies the manipulation by rms of their nonmarket environments.
Nonmarket environment
Just as rms must consider the prevailing market forces, so too must they be concerned about their nonmarket environments. As David Baron has argued, they must understand certain key nonmarket issues: the interests of major groups, the institutiona l setting within which policies are formulated , and the information available to actors.
18
Issues can includ e market-related questions as well as nonmarket problems that may have an impact on market activity. In an international context, and particularly in Asia, issues such as environmenta l and labor standard s immediately raise potential nonmarket constraints that can affect a rm's market strategy. Actors respond strategically to these issues in various institutiona l settings through negotiation , sometimes using tactics of "issue-packaging " or issue linkage. The strategic linking of issues may be based on knowledge (substantiv e links) or power (tactical linkages). Understanding the basis of a proposed issue linkage helps the analyst predict the likelihood of the linkage remaining stable and hence the formulation of strategy.
19
Many analysts take a pluralist view of government-business relations, seeing nonstate actors as competing for government attention. More sophisticated approaches to the relationship between state and societal actors focus on the formulation of the interests of state actors. According to this analysis, institution s are not simply arenas for the political activity of governments, rms, and other nonstate actors; the norms, rules, and practices of institution s also in uence the interests of major actors. That is, the motivations and capabilities of state actors both by themselves and within international institution s form an essential part of nonmarket analysis and strategy.
The last factor, information, refers to the commonly accepted bank of knowledge about particular issues. The word "information" as used by Baron is potentially misleading. The key component of the issue packaging and negotiation process is more aptly characterized as "knowledge," implying a certain type of theoretical and causal understandin g rather than just an accumulation of facts. In this context, knowledge provides a conceptual framework for the formulation of policy and affects the evolution of institutions . From a strategic perspective, the creation of new knowledge may provide a basis for cognitive agreement among different groups, allowing them to supercede zero-sum competition and enter into a mutually bene cial bargaining situation.
17. Hamel and Prahalad (1989) . 18. Baron (2000) . The "four I's" noted here provide a useful but limited rst cut to understand the nonmarket environment as discussed in the following paragraphs . 19. See, among others, Haas (1980) , Stein (1980) , Oye (1979) , and Aggarwal (1998) .
Positional analysis and the choice of trade and/or investment in Asia
The analysis to this point provides a basis for exploring the decision of rms to enter or to increase their presence in developing Asia through either a trade or investment strategy, or some combination of the two. This choice of strategy cannot be interpreted or predicted without a speci c analysis of the market and nonmarket environment of the industry in question and the position of the rm in that industry. During the crisis period in the late 1990s, however, weakened domestic rms in several East Asian markets provided obvious opportunit y for rapid market entry. This environment favored a strategy of investment, instead of increasing trade. Favorable exchange rates also encouraged foreign investors to increase their presence in Asia. IMF demands on East Asian countries to reduce their barriers to both trade and investment were an additiona l stimulus for investment and, to a lesser extent, to increased trade (though exports to East Asia obviously suffered from depressed regional demand).
By contrast, both before and after the crisis period, the determinants of a trade or investment strategy were not so clearly in favor of investment, despite the fact that some barriers have been reduced after the crisis. Under more normal conditions , the choice of strategy involves a more detailed analysis of the rm's core competencies, as well as the market and nonmarket environment for speci c industries. The case studies in this in this issue provide some insights into these types of decisions.
Strategic analysis: arenas, organizational mode, and nonmarket evaluation
The decision to focus primarily on trade or investment, based on an integrated consideration of market forces, rm core competencies, and the nonmarket environment, provides a rst cut at assessing a rm's overall strategy towards the Asian market. However, rms must face several other issues. What is a rm's market strategy with respect to product cost and quality, technology transfer, and market segments selection? How does a rm organize its regional or country-level trade or investment operations? What types of oppositio n or support is the strategy likely to receive from various nonmarket actors, and how should the rm position itself advantageously ? Figure 4 depicts the components that make up the "strategic analysis" triangle.
The following conceptual tools can be applied in analyzing these various strategic dimensions.
Arena strategy
Richard D'Aveni's work regarding the transformation of markets into states of hypercompetitio n can help us understand strategic choices in markets. 20 According to his analysis, rms compete in four different arenas: cost and quality, timing and know-how, strongholds , and "deep pockets." Traditional analysis 20. D'Aveni (1994).
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http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol3/iss2/art2 suggests that rms position themselves in one of these arenas-in cost and quality, for instance-and attempt to secure for themselves a high-cost/highquality position. As D'Aveni argues, however, these static positioning efforts are ultimately futile-and with improved technology and global competition, this futility is reached with increasing speed. Thus, as markets evolve, rms not only must reposition themselves continually within arenas, but also must be prepared to move vigorously into different arenas as opportunitie s (or threats) present themselves.
In the rst arena of competition, rms compete on the basis of cost and quality. In an ideal-typical characterization, rms initially begin with a homogeneous product and compete primarily on the basis of price. As price wars escalate, however, rms begin seeking other means of competition. Eventually, each differentiates itself from its competitors using new dimensions of quality and service. Although some rms try to cover the entire market by offering high-priced and high-qualit y products as well as low-priced and low-quality products, new competitors still have room to enter at either end by using niche or out anking strategies.
In order to escape the unending cycle of price-quality competition present in the rst arena of competition, rms focus on a second arena of competition, timing, and know-how. First movers who undertake a large investment may seize control of the market. Often, however, their products are easily imitable. To prevent imitation and maintain control of the market, the rst mover often creates barriers to market entry and develops its product in such a way as to make imitation dif cult. Eventually, however, competitors do succeed in entering the market and learn to imitate the rst mover's product. In response, the rst mover may use a strategy of leapfrogging innovation s in which new products are developed from large technological advances, entirely new resources, and know-how. While this again impedes the efforts of imitators, eventually they will again catch up to the leader. Again, the rst mover will likely attempt a new leapfrog move, and the cycle begins anew. According to D'Aveni, it continues until the "next generation leapfrog strategy" is too costly and the cycle becomes unsustainable.
21
In the third arena of competition, rms seek an advantage on a playing eld already leveled by price-quality competition and innovation. They do this by creating stronghold s to exclude competitors from their regional, industrial, or product market segments. As discussed by industrial organization theorists generally and Michael Porter in his analysis of ve forces, entry barriers that they create serve to insulate them from the price-quality and innovation -imitation cycles. Yet in contrast to this somewhat static view of barriers, in hypercompetition , such barriers provide only short-term relief, and are rarely sustainable in the long run. Competitors are likely to build war chests in their own stronghold s and then fund their entry into the strongholds of others. Usually, the attacked rm will respond by defending itself and then counterattacking in the initiating rms' stronghold . In the long run, these attacks and counterattacks weaken the stronghold s of both rms until no stronghold remains.
In the fourth arena of competition, large rms use "deep pockets" to their advantage. Essentially, rms with the greatest nancial resources try to gain an advantage by bullying smaller competitors. Such bullying often includes wearing down and undercutting smaller rms, which have fewer nancial resources and therefore cannot endure in the market as long as the deep-pocketed rm. In response, smaller competitors may develop formal or informal alliances, turn to the government for help, or seek to avoid competition with their powerful competitor. Eventually, after a series of moves and countermoves, the deeppocketed rm exhausts its resources and its advantage is either substantiall y diminished or neutralized .
Organizationa l strategy
The well-developed literature on transaction costs helps to illuminate the organization by rms of their investment or trading activities. 22 In examining contracts and organizational forms, Oliver Williamson emphasizes the importance of bounded rationality, opportunisti c behavior by actors, and highly speci c assets to construct predictions about governance structures. According to Williamson, the fundamental problem of contracts is that, given the nature of bounded rationality and opportunism , one cannot be sure that one's counterpart will perform as promised. In such cases, a rm that undertakes investments in highly speci c assets is vulnerable to exploitation because these assets cannot be transferred to other economic activities without substantial loss.
Witold Henisz has recently applied concepts of both economic and political transaction cost dilemmas to examine how rms might organize their foreign 21. D'Aveni (1994), p. 22. 22 . See Coase (1960) and Williamson (1985 Williamson ( , 1996 , among others.
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http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol3/iss2/art2 investment activities. 23 Henisz explores how the interaction of contractual and political hazards affects rms' choices. Speci cally, he argues that where contractual hazards exist, rms are likely to choose majority-controlled plants. These contractual hazards include a strong need to invest in speci c assets, potentially inappropriate use of technology by a joint venture partner, and free-riding on brand name or reputation.
24 By contrast, in the face of political hazards-which include, for instance, a fear of expropriation by a host government-rms are likely to prefer minority investment stakes where they might be able to use the skills and political standing of their venture partners to mitigate such hazards. The interaction effect of contractual and political hazards turns out to be empirically interesting. Henisz argues convincingl y that when both contractual and political hazards are high, rms prefer majority-owned subsidiaries because their joint venture partners might well use the power of the state against them. Henisz's work combines market, rm, and nonmarket analysis in an interesting way.
For our purposes, focusing on contractual hazards provides insight on how rms might organize both their trade and investment activities. Figure 5 presents an array of possible organizational forms that vary according to asset speci city concerns and nonmarket factors and hazards. Regarding trade, organizational forms will vary according to the level of perceived contractual hazards. Where hazards are perceived to be few, parties are likely to transact at arm's length. Where concern about such hazards is high, rms may choose to organize different operations internally, to ensure compliance. Similarly, for investment, contractual hazards could be mitigated by higher levels of ownership, albeit with the negative costs involved with maintaining a bureaucratically organized rm.
23. See the excellent work by Henisz (2000) , who draws upon Oliver Williamson's work on economic transaction costs and work by Douglass North (1981 North ( , 1999 on political transaction costs to examine organizationa l form choices for direct foreign investment in the context of possible expropriation . 24. Klein and Lef er (1981) and Henisz (2000) . Although our primary focus in this issue is not on rm organization and structuring, this model provides some insights into rms' organizational responses to market and nonmarket factors.
Nonmarket strategy
When rms pursue a market strategy, they often must deal with nonmarket actors such as labor or environmental groups, or governmental regulatory agencies. The "distributive politics spreadsheet" presented in Figure 6 provides a schematic breakdown of the supporting and opposing interests involved in a particular nonmarket issue. The gure describes the costs and bene ts that accrue to each party from supporting or opposing a particular course of action on an issue that may have consequences for a rm. 25 This gure, based on the well-known literature on interest group politics, provides a means of assessing the likely effectiveness of political actions of groups on each side of an issue. Turning rst to the demand side, we can observe the incentives of varying interest groups based on three factors: substitutes , which refers to alternatives available to a particular interest group to engaging in action on the issue at hand; the overall magnitud e of bene ts, which refers to the total bene ts that would result from success on an issue; and the per capita bene ts, which represent the motivation of a particular interest group based on the direct bene ts that its members will receive.
The supply side column presents the power capabilities of the actors in 25 . See the discussion in Baron (2000) .
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Corporate Market and Nonmarket Strategie s in Asia question, focusing on their numbers (i.e., how many groups or individuals can be involved), the coverage in terms of relevant political jurisdictions , and the resources that can be brought to bear on the issues. The last element, the cost of organizing, re ects the problems of overcoming collective action problems in view of the possibility of free riding and information dissemination . This analysis can be conducted for both the supporting and opposing side on any issue. The de nition of the issue-area(s) involved , and of which groups or individuals should be considered to be relevant political actors, depend on the problem being addressed and the geographical arena in which the interaction occurs. Once de ned, this analysis of distributiv e politics offers a window on a rm's calculations regarding which markets to enter and which integrated market and nonmarket strategies to apply.
Integrated strategic choice
Firms make strategic decisions that determine their position among the cells of the arenas matrix, as well as within a particular cell. For example, a rm must decide whether to concern itself with cost/quality at the national or regional level. From a market perspective, the success of its strategy will depend largely on whether or not there are other entrants, perhaps at the global level. This factor could be controlled through market actions and organizational strategies, thus moving the rm to cost/quality competitiveness in preparation for any competition, even from potential global competitors. Alternatively, rms may try to insulate the national or regional arena through nonmarket protectionis t actions. The choice between investing in market competitivenes s versus political activity is one that rms must make on an ongoing basis. To take a concrete example, rms in the telecommunications industry, faced with deregulation and new competition, have tried to position themselves globally both with respect to setting standard s (through the Comité Consultatif International Téléphonique et Télégraphique in the Internationa l Telecommunication Union) and to engaging in buyouts, alliances, and the like. This strategic choice has involved positionin g themselves for timing (standard setting) as well as in the cost/quality and strongholds arenas.
Tactical analysis: implementing strategy based on market, organizational, and nonmarket tactics
In order to implement a dynamic strategy successfully, rms must focus on three different tasks. The rst is to implement their market strategies through the development and use of their capabilities. The second involves executing nonmarket strategies, both as an adjunct to their market strategies and to create competitive space for a longer-term market strategy. Finally, rms must utilize and restructure their organizations to t their dynamic market and nonmarket strategies and to position themselves for new opportunities . These tasks are depicted in Figure 7 . 
Market tactics
There are three basic rm tasks in implementing market strategies: research and development (R&D), production, and marketing. When positionin g themselves in various arenas (e.g., in cost/quality and timing and know-how), rms must decide how best to compete. Thus, if the strategy chosen is to compete with other multinationals using know-how, it is self-evident that emphasis is placed on R&D, and therefore a critical question is where such activities might best be pursued . Japanese rms, for instance, have located their design centers for automobiles in the Los Angeles area to take advantage of that region's superior resources and to produce autos for the U.S. market more effectively. Alternatively, in choosing to use production networks across a number of Asian countries, European rms must decide where to conduct R&D, and must choose an appropriate market for production to lower their costs without excessively sacri cing quality.
Organizationa l tactics
Having chosen an appropriate form of trade or investment in light of transaction costs considerations , rms must structure their organization and management to succeed in their chosen market arena. Wholly-owned subsidiaries require knowledge of sourcing partners and personnel who understand local markets and who can deal with host governments. In the case of a rm that enters with a local partner in a joint venture, some of these tasks could be shifted to the local level to take advantage of the partner's local network and expertise. In such cases, however, skill in organizing and managing joint ventures with respect to contracting, nancing, and control are essential.
Similarly, with respect to trade strategies, rms must organize themselves to maximize their competitiveness . Sears' failed effort to compete with Japanese trading companies illustrates the challenges of operating in highly competitive markets and the need for organizational skill and learning.
With respect to nonmarket strategies and tactics, rms must develop their abilities to interact with governments, nongovernmenta l organizations , and other interest groups. Firms that concentrate only on market issues and attempt to outsource nonmarket tasks often suffer as a result of their neglect of this aspect of an integrated strategy.
Nonmarket tactics
Nonmarket problems require a carefully formulated , strategic response. Elements of such a strategy can include lobbying, grassroots activity, coalition building, testimony, political entrepreneurship, electoral support, communication and public advocacy, and judicial strategies. 26 For the most part these are self-explanatory. Grassroots activities refer to efforts to generate broad public support to in uence of ce holders. Political entrepreneurship means an active effort to shape a political agenda to bene t the interests of the rm. Examples of this tactic includ e negotiating for more open market policies in Japan, putting intellectual property issues on the GATT agenda in the Uruguay Round, and promoting of liberalized trade arrangements such as NAFTA. In most cases, entrepreneurship of this type will involve the building of coalitions with like-minded rms as well as various other tactical efforts to affect the agendasetting process.
Conclusion
Asia has long enticed foreign rms. This region includes many of the world's fastest growing markets, and promises to be a dynamic and ercely competitive arena for decades to come. The regional currency crises of 1997-1998 complicated but failed to diminish the region's appeal for multinationa l rms. Both before and after the crises, rms have attempted to devise trade and investment strategies that would give them a competitive advantage over their rivals. The objective of this article has been to present a novel integrated framework to understand market and nonmarket strategies, with an eye to providing a systematic basis for analyzing foreign rms' experiences in speci c sectors in Asia.
The rst part of this framework is a positional analysis, which examines the contours of the market in which rms operate, their speci c core competencies, and the nonmarket factors that affect their business. With respect to each of these three elements, rms must take into account the nature of their activities at the national, regional, or global levels. On this latter score, it is suggested that rms must make decisions about locating their trade or investment operations at the national, regional, and/or global level and must also decide on the target market for sales. Porter's " ve forces model" illuminates the opportunitie s and threats 26 . See Baron ( , 2000 for a discussion of these nonmarket tactics. rms face at these three geographical levels and provides insight into the barriers to entry presented by rm rivalry, the potential of new competitors entering the market, threats presented by possible market substitutes, and the bargaining power of suppliers and buyers.
In addition to market factors, the positiona l analysis also examines a rm's core competencies, which includes both tangible and nontangibl e capabilities, and nonmarket analysis, which involves the possible threats and opportunitie s arising from the nonmarket environment. Speci cally, rms must understand the issues raised, the interests of major groups, the institutiona l setting for policy resolution, and the information available to actors to cope with nonmarket challenges. Because these three sets of factors interact, rms operating in Asian markets must systematically analyze their market, core competencies, and nonmarket environment in formulating and implementing strategy.
The ensuing strategic and tactical analysis provides a framework for understanding rm's activities in light of relevant market, monmarket, and organizational factors. Efforts to develop market strategies have been analyzed from many perspectives. Particularly helpful is work on hypercompetition , which focuses on how rms compete in four different arenas: cost and quality, timing and know-how, strongholds, and deep pockets. Organizational strategy considers how rms restructure to compete in light of their overall environment and choice of market and nonmarket strategies, and particularly how rms organize to compete in trade and investment based on transaction cost considerations. At the level of nonmarket strategy, rms must engage in calculations about possible supporters and opponents on critical issues on both the demand side (what bene ts will different actors receive from success on an issue) and on the supply side (who will be able to generate political action). These considerations will often in uence a rm's decision on market strategy.
Finally, turning to tactics, rms must assess their abilities to execute market and nonmarket strategies and build competencies in this area as needed. Market tactics refer to rms' decisions regarding R&D, production, and marketing as they strive to compete in various market arenas. Organizational tactics involve the internal restructuring of their management and organizational structure. Nonmarket tactics concern policies that might be pursued to advance both market and nonmarket strategies. These includ e lobbying, grassroots activity, coalition building, testimony, political entrepreneurship , electoral support, communication and public advocacy, and judicial strategies.
Where might further investigatio n allow us to better understand the development of rm strategies for Asian markets? While an analytical framework can provid e guideline s for understanding rm strategies, the interaction of theoretical analysis and case study materials provides the richest insights. 27 The case studies that follow in this special issue, together with the forthcoming volumes from 27. It is worth noting that rm strategies obviously change over time in response to both changing market environment s as a result of the Asian crises and to evolving bilateral, regional, and international arrangements. Will progressive liberalization in Asia as a response to the recent crises and as a result of pressures from international nancial institutions create a signi cantly different regional environment ? These questions are addressed in the case studies because, from an analytical standpoint , we are fortunate to have been able to examine rm strategies both before and after the Asian crises.
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